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Abstract
The diffusion of new technologies is a lengthy process and many firms continue to
invest in relatively old technologies. This paper develops a vintage model of technology
adoption and diffusion that aims at explaining these two phenomena. Our explanation
for these phenomena emphasises the relevance of complementarity between different
vintages (or, alternatively, returns to diversity) and learning-by-using. The model is
characterised by simultaneous investments in vintages of different quality and
endogenously determined scrapping of old technologies. We show that the stronger the
complementarity between different vintages and the stronger the learning-by-using, the
longer it takes before firms scrap (seemingly) inferior technologies.
71. Introduction
A good understanding of well-documented differences in growth and productivity
performance of different countries requires an understanding of the complex process of
the development and diffusion of new technologies. Relatively much effort – amongst
others in the recent new or endogenous growth theory – has been devoted to
endogenising the rate of arrival of new technologies emphasising the importance of
R&D and human capital (e.g. Lucas 1988 and Grossman and Helpman 1991). However,
a good understanding of the diffusion and adoption of new technologies is in our view
at least equally important (see, for example, Jovanovic 1997). In this regard, we know
that diffusion of new technologies is a lengthy process, that adoption of new
technologies is costly and that many firms continue to invest in old and (seemingly)
inferior technologies. The relevance of the latter phenomenon has, for example,
convincingly been shown in the literature on the so-called energy-efficiency paradox;
the phenomenon that firms do not (exclusively) invest in technologies that according to
standard Net-Present-Value calculations yield the highest return (see, for example,
Howarth and Andersson 1993, Jaffe and Stavins 1994, and Sutherland 1991). The aim
of this paper is to contribute to our understanding of adoption behaviour of firms and of
diffusion processes of new technologies.
The question as to why firms do not invest in seemingly superior technologies has
already achieved much attention in the literature. We can categorise this literature in
four groups. The first category focuses on uncertainty. It emphasises that the
combination of uncertainty and some degree of irreversibility creates an option-value of
waiting. Thereby, it can explain the relatively slow diffusion of new and uncertain
technologies. Uncertainty can be related to the quality and performance of new
technologies, the speed of arrival of new and further improved technologies, input
prices of technology-specific inputs, etcetera (see, for example, Balcer and Lippman
1984, Dixit and Pindyck 1994 and Farzin et al. 1998 for work in this field). The second
line of research focuses on strategic issues in technology adoption. It elaborates on the
effects of (expected) rival innovation and imitation on the timing of innovation or
adoption in a world characterised by spill-overs and limited appropriability (see, among
others, Kamien and Schwartz 1972, Reinganum 1981 and Spence 1984). The third
approach focuses on the role of learning and spillovers. Learning improves the
performance of existing technologies and can have important spill-overs to the
8performance of other related technologies (e.g., Davies 1979, Jovanovic and Lach 1989,
and OECD/IEA 2000). A final category that we can distinguish focuses on the role of
vested interests. It argues that switching to new technologies (temporarily) reduces
expertise and destroys rents associated with working with relatively old technologies for
particular subgroups in the economy which may therefore engage in efforts aimed at
keeping the old technologies in place (see, for example, Canton et al. 1999, Jovanovic
and Nyarko 1994, Krusell and Ríos-Rull 1996).
In this paper we emphasise the role of learning as well as the relevance of
complementarity between different vintages. Our model has four distinctive features.
First, technology is embodied in physical capital. New vintages of capital are - when
considered in isolation - more productive than old ones. Second, capital goods of
different vintages are imperfect substitutes in production. Firms exhibit a ‘taste for
diversity’ of vintages creating an incentive to simultaneously invest in new and older
technologies. Third, firms gain expertise in a technology by using the technologies in
the production process. In other words, we incorporate learning-by-using. Fourth, our
model allows for the endogenous determination of the number of vintages used by
firms, so we offer an economically motivated approach for the scrapping of vintages.
We discuss these features more extensively when presenting the model in section 2.
There are a number of related articles in which issues of learning and technological
innovation and diffusion are analysed. Without extensive discussion, we refer to, for
example, Aghion and Howitt (1996), Aghion et al. (1997, 1999), Arrow (1962), Chari
and Hopenhayn (1991), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1996), Parente (1994), Stokey (1988)
and Young (1993a,b). The main differences between these studies and ours are that we
(i) emphasise the importance of complementarity of vintages, (ii) emphasise diffusion
instead of innovation and (iii) provide a supply-oriented explanation for the endogenous
scrapping of old vintages (or, alternatively, the modernisation of the capital stock).
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we set up the basic model. This model is
solved in section 3. The comparative static characteristics of the model, illustrating the
importance of complementarity and learning-by-using for understanding diffusion
patterns of new technologies, are presented in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes
and discusses roads for future research.
92. The model
The model that we develop is essentially a simple two-sector vintage model that is
characterised by learning-by-using and ‘returns to diversity’. The two sectors that we
distinguish are (i) a final goods sector in which a homogeneous consumption good is
produced using labour and capital and (ii) a capital goods sector consisting of (a mass
of) T monopolistically competitive firms each producing a particular vintage of capital.
The only factor of production in the model is labour which is used for assemblage of
final consumption goods and for the production of capital or intermediate inputs.
The model that we develop can be considered as a vintage model in the sense that
capital inputs used in production are heterogeneous in their productivity or quality. For
simplicity, capital is assumed to be non-durable. The model can therefore also be
considered as a model with heterogeneous intermediate inputs. An advantage - at least
for presentational purposes - of this assumption is that the coexistence of different
vintages can, by definition, not be explained on the basis of incomplete depreciation of
the existing capital stock as is common in 'traditional' vintage models. The productivity
of vintages depends on its date of 'invention' and the intensity with which it has been
used in the past. The latter captures the relevance of learning-by-using. Furthermore,  in
contrast with the more traditional vintage models, our model exhibits a ‘taste for
diversity’ of vintages. This implies that in our model firms have incentives to invest in
older technologies, even if new technologies are available that are ‘better’ when
considered in isolation. Vintages are in other words imperfectly substitutable or to some
degree complementary, whereas in traditional vintage models firms only invest in best
practice technologies (for example, Meijers 1994). The very reason that old and new
vintages coexist in the traditional models is that once firms have incurred the (partly)
sunk investment cost, it need not be optimal to replace this capital once a superior
technology becomes available. By contrast, we argue that complementarity is an
essential ingredient in the process of technological change and an important reason for
the coexistence of different vintages. Many new technologies pass through a life cycle,
in which they initially complement older technologies, and only subsequently (and often
slowly) substitute for the older technologies. A number of historical examples, like for
example the replacement of the waterwheel by the steam engine, illustrate the role of
complementarities in this ‘life cycle view’ of technological change (see for example
Rosenberg 1976, Young 1993b). One can argue that modern production processes
10
consist of even more interrelated and mutually reinforcing technologies than the
documented historical examples. Whereas Young (1993b) employs the idea that
complementary innovation is the result of rent-seeking inventive activity on the part of
innovators, we focus on the role of adopters that wish to invest in complementary
technologies.
In the context of adoption of new technologies, one can think of various underpinnings -
not explicitly modelled in this paper - for these complementarities. First, firms may face
uncertainty about the performance of new technologies. Older more certain technologies
then complement the newer ones by providing the possibility to hedge against the
uncertain performance of the new technology. Second, in large firms a range of
different techniques coexists and the production process may be seen as a puzzle of a
large number of technology pieces. It is then reasonable that firms continually invest in
improvement of distinct pieces instead of replacing the whole puzzle at once. Third,
when technological improvement takes the form of additional improvement of already
adopted techniques (retrofit), there is a reason to invest in older basic techniques. The
formulation that we use in our model captures these ideas in a very stylized way. It is
inspired by the product-variety theory which started with the seminal work of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977) and was later extended and applied by, for example, Ethier (1982),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Romer (1990). As first proposed by Ethier (1982),
we assume returns to a diversity of capital vintages (of heterogeneous quality) instead of
returns to variety of consumer durables or intermediate goods.
2.1 The final goods sector
The final goods sector produces a homogeneous consumption good according to a
Cobb-Douglas production function:
1
t t YtY K L
α α−
= (=1=)
in which tY  represents output produced in year t, and tK  and YtL  are the capital- and
labour input in final goods production, respectively. Capital is an aggregate of vintages
of capital goods. Vintages are characterised by the first year of their availability τ. The
aggregate capital stock is formulated as (building on the seminal work of Dixit and
Stiglitz 1977):
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in which T is the (endogenous) mass of vintages in use, ,tKτ  is the amount of capital of
vintage τ used in year t (where t T tτ− ≤ ≤ ) and ,tAτ  is a vintage-specific
productivity parameter (which is where the model deviates from the standard Dixit and
Stiglitz framework). Alternatively, T can be interpreted as the age of the oldest vintage
in use. Technological change is embodied in new vintages. The elasticity of substitution
between any pair of vintages (in efficiency units AK) is denoted by ε. Vintages are
assumed to be closed but imperfect substitutes ( ∞<< ε1 ).
The productivity of vintages develops according to two factors. The first is exogenous.
Newer vintages - as they are brought on the market - are more productive than older
vintages when those were brought on the market. Secondly, vintages improve as they
are used. Hence, the productivity endogenously depends on the cumulative investments
in vintages. We further label this learning-by-using. More specifically, we assume that
the productivity of vintages ( ,tAτ ) develops according to
[ ] ( )ττλτττ gtgt eAAaCeAA 0max1,0, )1(1 −+−+= − (=3=)
In this specification, A0  is initial productivity, g is an exogenously given growth rate of
the productivity of new vintages, a measures the strength of learning-by-using effects,
 Ct  represents past cumulative investments in vintage τ ),(
,
, dtKC
t
t
t
ττ
τ =  λ
represents the curvature of the learning-curve and maxτA is the vintage-specific
maximum productivity level (that is, the productivity level when the technology has
matured). For simplicity, we assume that maxτA  is in fixed proportion γ(≥1) to the
productivity at the date of introduction of the vintage ( ττ γ geAA 0max = ). In the special
case in which γ=1, the learning-by-using mechanism is absent and productivity of
vintages purely depends on the exogenous improvements. The assumption that 0<λ<1
implies that the productivity of a technology in the presence of learning-by-using (γ>1)
gradually converges to the mature productivity level maxτA once the technology starts to
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penetrate into the production process.1 Figure 1 depicts a typical example of
productivity development of two different vintages. The newer vintage (starting more to
the right) is potentially more productive, but initially the old technology outperforms the
new technology due to learning-by-using.
Figure 1. Productivity development with learning-by-using
                                                          
1 From equation (3) we can also determine the learning rate. This rate indicates the
percentage with which the productivity increases if installed capacity is doubled. In the
specification for productivity development that we have chosen, the learning rate depends –
among others – on the capacity that has already been installed (C0). More specifically, we
can determine the learning rate as
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This learning rate is declining in C0 so the learning rate decreases as a technology penetrates
further into the economy. Learning ultimately stops as the technology reaches maturity.
This pattern is broadly consistent with empirical evidence on learning rates which has
convincingly shown that learning rates are – at least – kinked, that is high at low levels of
penetration and low at higher levels of penetration (e.g. OECD/IEA 2000).
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The above formulation captures the idea that the (potential) productivity level of a new
vintage as it comes on the market at t=τ is higher than of an old vintage. For the purpose
of this paper, we do not further  elaborate on the innovation process that underlies the
improvement of new vintages, but focus on the diffusion process. We allow for effects
of learning as the product of the utilization of the technology by the final user by
allowing productivity to improve with the intensity with which it has been used in the
past. This learning-by-using has to be distinguished from the learning in R&D stages
and learning in producing the technology, the so-called learning-by-doing (Rosenberg
1976). As a result of the presence of learning-by-using, and in accordance with broad
historical evidence (see for example Mokyr 1990, Rosenberg 1976 and Young 1993a),
new technologies can initially be inferior to more mature technologies. Learning-by-
using improves the productivity and performance of the new technology over time and
this learning can - at least initially - be so fast that it dominates the improvement of
newly arriving vintages.
For the time being, we assume for reasons of analytical tractability of the model that
learning-by-using is absent (γ=1). We generalise and discuss the implications of
allowing for learning-by-using for diffusion patterns and adoption of technologies in
section 4.2.
The behaviour of producers in the final goods sector is guided by profit-maximisation.
They operate under perfect competition and a representative firm maximises profits (π):
−
−−=
t
Tt
ttKYtttYtt dKPLwYP τπ ττ ,, (=4=)
in which YP , w and PKτ denote the output price, the wage rate and the price of capital
goods of a specific vintage, respectively (we omit time-indices if possible). Vintage
capital is bought from the capital goods sector to which we turn in the next subsection.
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2.2 The capital production sector
The capital production sector consists of (a mass of) T monopolistically competitive
firms each producing a specific vintage according to2
, ,t K tK Lτ τ= (=5=)
In addition, firms in this sector have to pay a fixed cost in terms of labour (Lf) before
being able to produce. Firms maximise their profits according to
, , , ,max ( )t K t t k t f tP K L L wτ τ τ τπ = − + (=6=)
The model is closed by imposing labour market equilibrium which - assuming a
constant and exogenous labour supply L - reads as:
( )
−
++=
t
Tt
ftKYt dLLLL ττ , (=7=)
In the next section, we discuss the solution of the model, focusing on the allocation of
labour and the determination of the mass of vintages used in the production process.
3. Solution of the model
At the heart of the solution procedure is the notion that the mass of vintages that is used
is endogenous. Or, stated alternatively, the age of the oldest vintage in use is
endogenous. To understand this intuitively, it is important to notice that newer vintages
are more productive than older ones and the producers of vintages have to pay a fixed
cost in terms of labour. As a result of the gradual increase in productivity of newer
vintages, the (relative) demand for old vintages will gradually decline over time. The
                                                          
2 We assume that in each period, a new vintage becomes available due to an exogenous
process of technological innovation (see equation 3) and only one firm acquires the right
to produce capital of this particular vintage. It is of course possible to generalize here and
to model a separate sector producing the brands and selling these to the firms producing
the capital. In such a setting, firms in the capital production sector would be willing to
buy the patent to produce the specific brand and acquire the monopoly right to produce,
provided that the profits that can be earned over time are equal to the costs of the patent
(compare, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 1991). Such a generalization, though
interesting, would not add to the basic insights we want to emphasise in this paper.
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complementarity between vintages of different age is the reason that firms do not
immediately shift to the most productive vintage. At some point in time, however, the
demand for a vintage becomes so low that it can no longer profitably be supplied by the
producer of that vintage. Supply will stop and the vintage disappears from the market.
This 'scrapping' of vintages is - in contrast with the more traditional vintage-literature -
caused by the impossibilities to profitably supply the vintage, whereas the traditional
vintage explains scrapping from the fact that at some point in time, the vintage can no
longer profitably be used by the owner. Note that at this point the demand for this
vintage is still positive but small. Our model thereby offers an alternative economically
motivated approach for scrapping of vintages that differs from, for example, Den
Hartog and Tjan (1980) and Malcolmson (1975).
Let us now turn to the solution of the model more formally. Producers in the final-goods
sector perform a standard profit maximisation problem in two stages (maximisation of
equation (4)). First, they determine the optimal relative demand for (the composite of)
capital and labour. This results in the standard allocation rule for a Cobb-Douglas
production function implying constant cost shares of capital and labour:
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in which PK is the price index of the composite capital good. In the second stage, they
decide on the optimal amount of capital of each vintage by solving the following
maximisation problem:
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Optimisation yields a downward-sloping demand curve for capital of a specific vintage:
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The relative demand for two vintages of different age thus depends on their relative
productivity and their relative prices. This relative demand will be more responsive to
productivity differences, the easier the vintages can be substituted for each other.
Producers in the vintage production sector maximise their profits (equation (6)) subject
to the downward-sloping demand curve for the vintage that they produce (equation
(10)). This results in standard mark-up pricing, according to which the producers of
vintages put a mark-up over labour costs.:
1
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τ t
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t wP
L
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The mark-up is larger the larger the complementarity between different vintages (i.e.,
the smaller ε).
This basically concludes the description of behaviour of firms in our economy.  The
model is subsequently solved by essentially determining the mass of vintages that can
be sustained in the economy (that is, the age of the oldest vintage that can be sustained).
For this, we first need to determine the allocation of labour over the production or
assemblage of final goods and the production of vintages, respectively. Using the fact
that cost shares of capital and intermediates are constant, we can determine the
allocation of labour. Using equations (5), (8) and (11), we derive that :
−
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This expression reveals that more assemblage labour will be used relative to labour used
for producing vintages, the smaller the share parameter in the production function of
final goods and the lower the elasticity of substitution. The latter is caused by the fact
that a low elasticity of substitution results in relatively high prices of vintages due to
mark-up pricing and results in a shift from capital to labour in final goods production.
Substituting this expression in the labour market equilibrium (equation (7)) and
rewriting yields an expression for labour use in production of vintage capital:
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Firms in the capital production sector continue to produce their specific vintage as long
as this is profitable. So they produce as long as
tftKttK wLLKP )( ,,, +≥ τττ (=14=)
Using the production function for vintages and mark-up pricing (equations (5) and
(11)), this expression can be rewritten (with equality) as
,
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This expression basically determines the minimally required scale of operation for a
producer of vintages (and hence, the minimal demand for a particular vintage that is
needed for the producer of that vintage to be able to operate profitably). From (15), this
minimal demand can be derived as
fLLK )1( −== ε (=16=)
in which L  is the amount of labour used to produce the oldest vintage which is in use
by the final good production sector. Clearly, the minimum scale of operation or the
minimal demand for a particular vintage is larger the larger the fixed cost and the larger
the elasticity of substitution (and hence the lower the mark-up the producers of the
vintages can charge). Any firm that would intend to produce an older vintage for which
there would be less demand due to its lower productivity would make losses.
Having determined the production level of the oldest vintage, we can uniquely
determine the production levels of more recent vintages which are in use by combining
the expression for the relative demand for different vintages and the productivity
difference between these vintages. Substituting the expressions for the price of capital
(equation (11)) and the growth rate of productivity of new vintages (equation (3)) into
equation (10) and rewriting yields (in the absence of learning-by-using; i.e. γ=1):
)()1(
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Figure 2 graphically illustrates this expression by displaying the production of one
particular vintage (arriving on the market at t=τ) over time. Expression (17) reveals that
in the presence of exogenous improvements of the performance of newer vintages
(g>0), more labour is used for the production of more recent vintages (higher τ). The
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effect of improvement of performance on (relative) labour use is reinforced when the
degree of complementarity among vintages declines. In the special case in which g=0,
vintages are equally productive and we end up with a symmetric solution of the model).
Figure 2. Production of one particular vintage over time
The total amount of labour used for the production of vintages thus equals (using
equations (16) and (17)):
[ ] [ ]
g
eL
g
eLdeLdL
gT
f
gTT
g
t
Tt
tK
1
)1(
1 )1()1(
0
)1(
,
−
=
−
−
==
−
−
−
−
εε
τε
τ ε
ττ = (=18=)
Combining equations (13) and (18) we can now solve for the mass of vintages that can
be sustained in the economy (or, alternatively, the age of the oldest vintages in use).
This solution for T is given by the following implicit function:
( ) [ ] [ ]fgTf TLLgeL −−=−− − )1(1)1( εααε ε (=19=)
The comparative static characteristics of the model will be discussed in the next section.
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4. Comparative static characteristics
The aim of this section is to illustrate the comparative static characteristics of the model.
This is mainly done by relying on a graphical method that enables us to both illustrate
the solution of the model as it was discussed in the previous section and the comparative
static characteristics. In section 4.1, we will discuss the importance of the degree of
complementarity between different vintages for understanding the adoption and
diffusion of new vintages. In section 4.2, we elaborate on the importance of learning-
by-using. This is done by generalising the productivity development of vintages, as it
was introduced in section 2.
4.1 The effects of complementarity
The degree of complementarity is captured by the elasticity of substitution between the
vintages. The consequences of an increase in the elasticity of substitution (that is, a
lower degree of complementarity) can best be understood by dividing the total effect
into three components. Note that we assume the learning effect to be absent. First,
increased substitutability reduces the mark-up that producers of intermediates can
charge. Consequently, the minimal demand required for these producers to operate
profitably increases. Secondly, increased substitutability implies that the relative
demand for vintages is more responsive to increases in productivity of newer vintages.
Finally, the increased substitutability lowers the price of intermediates relative to wages.
As a consequence, firms in the final goods sector will, ceteris paribus, increase their
demand for intermediates. These three effects can be illustrated graphically. This is
done in Figure 3.3
                                                          
3 Figure 3 is based on a discrete version of the model with the following parametrization:
α=0.6, w=1 (numeraire), g=0.05, A0=1, L=300, Lf=2, and γ=1.=The elasticity of
substitution is equal to ε=6.87=in the low-complementarity case and ε=5.25 in the high-
complementarity case. This results in T=6 and T=8, respectively. Details on the numerical
analysis are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 3. Demand for vintages of different age at one point in time
- the no-learning case
Figure 3 depicts the demand for vintages of different age (on the vertical axis) as a
function of the date of introduction on the market (on the horizontal axis). The most
recent (current) vintage is located most to the right in the figure. The figure can be
understood as follows. Consider first the case in which the elasticity of substitution is
low (i.e., complementarity between different vintages is strong). The upward slope of
the demand curve reflects the fact that newer vintages (located more to the right) are
more productive and consequently have a higher demand. The demand for the oldest
vintage is given as the minimal required demand as defined in equation (16) and is
represented by the lowest point on the demand curve. The surface below the demand
curve is equal to the amount of labour that is available for the production of vintages as
it is given in equation (13). Combining these three elements yields a unique solution of
the model that is essentially characterised by the age of the oldest vintage.
Let us now consider what happens when the elasticity of substitution increases (i.e., the
degree of complementarity declines). In terms of the figure, the minimal required
demand increases. This, ceteris paribus, implies a reduction of the equilibrium number
of vintages. Secondly, the demand curve gets steeper as users of the vintages become
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more responsive to productivity differences. Ceteris paribus, this also implies that the
equilibrium number of vintages that can be sustained in the economy declines. Thirdly,
producers of final goods shift their input towards capital as capital becomes relatively
cheap. This is reflected by an upward shift of the demand curve. This effect works
opposite to the two previous effects and implies that more vintages can be sustained.
However, the former two effects dominate for reasonable parameter values4 and
increased substitutability reduces the number of vintages that can be sustained.
Complementarity thus slows down the rate of modernisation of the capital stock.
4.2 The effects of learning-by-using
In the previous section, we have assumed the learning-by-using effect to be absent
(γ=1). We will now drop this assumption and assume that productivity of vintages
initially increases at a relatively fast rate when the vintage is introduced in order to slow
down at later stages and to mature (γ>1 and λ<1). Empirical evidence seems to suggest
that indeed the initial learning rate can be quite strong (Argote 1999 and McDonald and
Schrattenholzer 2000). This would suggest that situations can arise in which
productivity of vintages that have been introduced some periods ago exceeds
productivity of vintages that have been introduced more recently. This possibility was
already illustrated in Figure 1. The implications of such developments of productivity
should now be relatively easy to understand. The productivity development as
suggested in Figure 1 implies that there is a vintage of intermediate age that is
characterised by the highest productivity. Older vintages are less productive since their
learning-by-using potential has declined (or, in other words, those vintages have
matured), whereas newer vintages have not yet matured and experienced the
productivity improvements due to learning-by-using. The implications of such
developments for the diffusion of new technologies are illustrated in Figure 4. This
                                                          
4 This conclusion is based on extensive simulations with the model. The details are
available upon request from the authors. Applying the implicit function theorem on
equation (19), we derive that the age of the oldest vintage declines with an increase in the
degree of complementarity if
( )[ ] gLgTgTeL gTf αααεε >−+−+− 1)(1)1(
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figure is comparable to Figure 3, but now learning-by-using is included.5  Clearly, new
vintages are initially demanded at a relatively limited scale due to their low
productivity, but as they improve due to learning-by-using they will be demanded more
in order to subsequently be gradually phased out of the production process as the
vintage matures and ultimately becomes obsolete. Based upon the similar logic as
explained in section 4.1, a higher elasticity of substitution will result in fewer vintages
being used in the production process and at the same time stronger responses to
differences in productivity levels between vintages of different age.
Figure 4. Demand for vintages- the effects of learning-by-using
                                                          
5 Figure 4 is based on a discrete version of the model with the following parametrization:
α=0.6, w=1 (numeraire), g=0.05, A0=1, L=300, Lf=2, γ=1.25,=a=0.2 and λ=0.5.=The
elasticity of substitution is equal to ε=5.5=in the low-complementarity case and ε=5.25 in
the high-complementarity case. This results in T=6 and T=8, respectively. Details are
available upon request from the authors.
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5. Conclusion
The widespread adoption and diffusion of new technologies is a lengthy and costly
process. In this paper we developed a vintage model to study the diffusion of new
technologies and to explain why diffusion is gradual and firms continue to invest in
seemingly inferior technologies. A key characteristic of our model is that vintages are
complementary; there are returns to diversity of using different vintages. We have
argued that this is a potentially relevant part of the explanation for why firms continue
to invest in older technologies when newer ones are available. Furthermore, we showed
that this effect is intensified when we take a learning-by-using effect into account. The
loss of expertise - gained by using a particular vintage and building up experience -
which a firm suffers from when switching to a newer vintage provides an extra
argument for firms to invest in older vintages. Another important characteristic of the
model is the endogenous determination of the number of vintages that is used in the
production process. In our analysis we show that the stronger the complementarity
between different vintages and the stronger the learning-by-using effect, the longer it
takes before firms scrap (seemingly) inferior technologies. Decreased complementarity
(or, alternatively, increased competition) in other words speeds up the modernisation of
the capital stock.
Clearly, the simple model developed in this paper could be extended in a number of
interesting directions. First, we can allow for the endogenous determination of the rate
of learning-by-using and the rate of improvement of new vintages. We refer here to
Aghion and Howitt (1996) for such a kind of analysis, drawing a distinction between
research (developing new vintages) and development (improving existing vintages).
Secondly, we intend to introduce a second factor of production, energy, in order to use
the model to shed light on the so-called energy-efficiency paradox referred to in the
introduction of this paper (e.g. Jaffe and Stavins 1994). Finally, we intend to allow for
the incomplete depreciation of capital in order to assess the importance of
complementarity in understanding the development of the stock of capital of different
vintages and the investment behaviour of firms.
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